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The unravelling of the Middle-East peace process contin-
ues to baffle the pundits. The early optimism of the Oslo 
peace accord has now turned into despair. Prime minister 
Rabin was assassinated by a Jewish extremist. The Pales-
tinians have embarked on a new Intifada. And Israel has re-
occupied much of the West Bank. What brought this rever-
sal? How deep are the fractures? Can they be healed? 
FROM ‘WAR PROFITS’ TO ‘PEACE DIVIDENDS’ 
On the surface, these are matters of ‘foreign policy.’ But 
there is an additional and often ignored layer here, related 
to fundamental shifts in the nature of capital accumulation, 
ownership and intra-capitalist conflict.  
In order to understand this broader picture, we need 
to go back a bit in history. In the mid 1960s, Michal Kal-
ecki, one of the more brilliant political economists of the 
20th century, wrote two articles in which he argued that 
the growing involvement of the United States in Vietnam 
was grounded in a major realignment within the U.S. 
ruling class.1 According to Kalecki, this realignment in-
volved a widening rift between the ‘old’ civilian industries 
located in East Coast, and the ‘new’ business groups, 
primarily armament producers in the West Coast and oil 
interests based in Texas. The rise in military budgets, he 
predicted, would effect a redistribution of income from 
former to the latter. The ‘angry elements’ within the U.S. 
ruling class would be significantly strengthened, pushing 
for a more aggressive foreign policy and propagating fur-
ther what others would later call the ‘permanent war 
economy.’ 
Most of those writing on the issue reiterate the lan-
guage of Huntington’s ‘clash of civilisations.’ What we see 
in the Middle East, they tell us, is just another manifesta-
tion of ‘Jihad vs. McDonald’s.’ It is the same old story of 
‘religious fundamentalism’ against ‘the market,’ of ‘xeno-
phobic nationalism’ against ‘neoliberalism,’ of the ‘third 
world’ against the ‘first world.’ And there is perhaps some 
truth to these generalisations. 
The idea of a third-world ‘backlash’ against neoliberal 
globalisation is certainly easy to understand. For most 
people in the so-called ‘South’ – including the Palestinians 
– the last decade has brought greater insecurity, depriva-
tion and hopelessness, so their resentfulness could hardly 
be surprising. This resentfulness, we are told, is harnessed 
by various religious and ethnic groups who feel threatened 
by capitalism, and resort to ‘global terrorism’ as a way of 
retaining their hegemony. And indeed, during the 1970s and early 1980s, the 
politics of global accumulation have become increasingly 
dominated by rising military budgets, arms exports and 
heightened conflict in the periphery, particularly the Mid-
dle East. 
What seems less clear is the sudden bellicosity of 
‘Northern’ governments, particularly those of the U.S. and 
the U.K. Over the past decade, these governments have 
tirelessly glorified the ‘global village.’ What the world 
needed, they said, was open borders, free trade and capital 
mobility. So why the sudden shift to ‘with-us-or-against-us’ 
patriotism? Do they really expect ‘war on terrorism’ to 
bring global security? Is rising military budgets and cascad-
ing attacks against less developed countries the best way to 
turn the poor and hungry from ‘religious fanatics’ into ‘free 
marketers’? If the purpose is peace and stability, why not 
force Israel to comply with UN resolutions and let the Pal-
estinians finally have their state? Is letting Ariel Sharon 
smash his way back into West Bank a better recipe – or 
perhaps peace and stability aren’t really the goals in this 
saga? What type of world order do Bush, Blair and Sharon 
have in mind, and who stand to gain from this ‘order’? 
Central to this process was the formation of an uneasy 
‘Weapondollar-Petrodollar Coalition,’ made up of large oil 
companies, armament contractors and OPEC, and backed 
by the U.S. and several European governments who sup-
plied arms and encouraged high oil prices. The accumula-
tion ‘mechanism’ of this coalition was based on the ongo-
ing cycle of Middle-East ‘energy conflicts’ and ‘oil crises.’ 
The logic of the process was relatively simple. Rising petro-
leum prices brought massive profits for the oil companies. 
They also generated huge petrodollar revenues for local 
OPEC governments, who were only too eager to spend 
                                                 
1 Michal Kalecki, “The Fascism of Our Times” and “Vietnam 
and U.S. Big Business,” reprinted in The Last Phase in the 
Transformation of Capitalism (New York and London: Modern 
Reader, 1972). 
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them on expensive weaponry in preparation for the next 
war. As a result, the Middle East became the world’s larg-
est market for imported arms, absorbing over 1/3rd of the 
total. The big arms contractors of course loved this ar-
rangement, and the various U.S. administrations – from 
Nixon’s to Bush Sr.’s – supported it with equal zeal. In-
deed, what better way to fight communism, divide and rule 
the Middle East, and enrich your corporate friends – all in 
one stroke and without investing a penny? 
The consequences of this process were nothing short of 
dramatic. Rising oil prices threw much of the world into a 
deep ‘stagflationary’ crisis (stagnation combined with infla-
tion), conflict bloomed everywhere, and there was even the 
occasional flirt with nuclear exchange. The Weapondollar-
Petrodollar Coalition, how-
ever, thrived. As Figure 1 
shows, oil and armament 
companies became the 
world’s most profitable firms, 
seeing their earnings rise to 
19% of the world total after 
the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, 
and to 21% after the 1980 
onset of the Iran-Iraq War. 
‘War profits’ were clearly the 
way to go. 
All of this changed in the 
1990s. The cold war ended, 
the world opened up for 
business, and the Weapon-
dollar-Petrodollar Coalition 
disintegrated. In its place, a 
different ‘Technodollar-
Mergerdollar Alliance,’ based 
on civilian high-tech and 
corporate takeover rose to 
prominence. Instead of ‘war 
profits,’ nationalism and con-
flict, it marshalled a new 
rhetoric of ‘peace dividends,’ 
foreign investment and emerging markets. Capital controls 
gave way to deregulation, protectionism to privatisation, 
and bloody wars to peace deals. And indeed, by end of 
2000, the Technodollar-Mergerdollar Alliance seemed vic-
torious. As Figure 1 illustrates, its global profit share 
soared to 15%, while that of the oil and armament compa-
nies sank to a meagre 3%. 
ISRAELI CAPITALISM GOES GLOBAL 
Israel’s U-turn of the 1990s, from a welfare-warfare state to 
liberalism and regional reconciliation, is part of this global 
shift. Until the late 1980s, private business and national 
security went hand in hand. Israel served the Weapondol-
lar-Petrodollar coalition by engaging in seasonal wars and 
various clandestine operations – this in return for massive 
U.S. military assistance, a tacit acceptance of Israel’s nu-
clear build-up, and a licence to run a closed war economy. 
During the mid-1970s, Israel’s military expenditure soared 
to 33% of GDP – with roughly 15% imported from U.S. 
and the remaining 18% spent locally. The large local firms 
lunched at the military procurement table, while benefiting 
handsomely from the resulting inflation which ravaged 
much of the economy, but fuelled the stock market which 
they helped rig. The social cohesion necessary for sustain-
ing this war economy was cemented by welfare spending, 
Zionist nationalism and frequent armed conflict. The Pal-
estinians provided the cheap labour force in this equation, 
and were pacified by a combination of relatively higher 
standards of living and a large dose of force. 
By the early 1990s, 
though, the arithmetic 
changed. Following George 
Bush’s announcement of a 
‘new world order,’ Israeli 
military spending came un-
der the axe, falling to 10% of 
GDP by the mid-1990s; 
weapon exports went into a 
tailspin; and pressures to 
open up the domestic econ-
omy mounted. To compli-
cate things further the 
Palestinians revolted, and the 
mounting cost of squelching 
their Intifada now seemed 
huge compared with rapidly 
vanishing war profits. It was 
clearly time to shift gears. 
The loss-making welfare-
warfare state was ceremoni-
ally dumped, replaced by the 
new and more lucrative al-
ternative of transnational 
neoliberalism. 
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The political front win-
dow of the process was of course the Oslo Peace Accord, 
but there was more here than meet the eyes. Normalising 
relations with the Palestinians paved the way to peace 
agreements with other Arab countries; these agreements 
brought an end to the Arab boycott; and with conflict 
quickly receding, Israel was able to remove capital controls 
– the main barrier to globalisation. During the earlier pe-
riod of strife, capital controls were necessary to prevent 
capital from flying out of the country en masse. When con-
flict receded, these controls could be removed, the currency 
floated, and the globalisation of ownership begin in ear-
nest. 
Within a few years the local business elite has shifted 
its attention outside the country, increasingly aligning itself 
with, and integrating into an emerging transnational busi-
ness class. The evidence of this integration is overwhelm-
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ing. Foreign institutional investors now own 10-15% of the 
Tel-Aviv stock market. Many of the country’s largest cor-
porations have been taken over by non-resident ‘Israelis’ – 
such as the Arison family of Carnival Cruise who bought 
the leading Bank Hapoalim, and the Bronfman family of 
Vivendi-Seagram which controls the conglomerate Koor. 
Most of Israel’s leading high-tech firms, such as Comverse, 
Check Point, Amdocs and Teva, are Israeli mostly by 
name, having their shares listed in New York and much of 
their activity carried outside the country. The vast majority 
of the country’s start-up companies have been driven by 
‘inverted cannibalism,’ desperately looking for a global 
giant to take them over. Indeed, the whole outlook of the 
Israeli business sector is pointing overseas. Until the late 
1980s this trend was mostly 
reflected in rising exports 
which have recently 
reached 1/3 of GDP, but 
since the early 1990s capital 
too has began moving out, 
with outflowing investment 
accounting for roughly 1-
2% of GDP, and growing. 
The result of this trans-
nationalisation are evident 
in Figure 2, which charts 
the increasing correlation 
between the Tel-Aviv stock 
market and the Nasdaq. 
Over the past five years this 
correlation has reached 0.8, 
up from a negative 0.3 in 
the early 1980s, suggesting 
that 80% of ‘Israeli’ accu-
mulation depend not on 
what happens locally, but in 
the global high-tech market. 
Israeli capitalists have fi-
nally realised their Ameri-
can dream of a ‘New Mid-
dle East’: local by denomination, global by accumulation.  
ABANDONING THE DOMESTIC POPULATION 
And, yet this transition wasn’t as easy as the elite assumed 
it would be. With the capitalist elite increasingly focused 
on the Nasdaq, the high-tech business and markets in the 
rest of the world, domestic and regional ‘details’ were seen 
as less and less important. Somehow, these details were 
expected to take care of themselves; and if they didn’t – 
well, that was no longer a matter of great concern. After 
all, accumulation was now global, not local. 
As it turned out, however, the details hardly ‘fixed 
themselves,’ and were certainly far from unimportant. To 
begin with, the Israeli elite seemed to have confused corpo-
rate peace dividends with real peace. Its intention was to 
replicate the apartheid arrangement by making Arafat head 
of a ‘Palustan,’ a semi-autonomous entity with only half its 
original territories, no army, no fiscal and monetary sover-
eignty, limited access to water, and complete dependence 
on Israeli infrastructure. Most importantly, it left the Jew-
ish settlements intact, making the resulting Palestinian en-
tity look like Swiss cheese with holes full of ethnic and reli-
gious time-bombs. If there was a recipe for another Intifada, 
this was clearly it. 
More broadly, despite its peace treaties with Egypt and 
Jordan, and normalised relations with other neighbours, 
Israel remained regionally isolated – only a negligible pro-
portion of its trade and investment flows were with sur-
rounding countries, and beyond diplomacy there was 
really little cultural and in-
tellectual interchange. In 
the absence of such secular 
ties, religious hostility to-
ward Israel continued to 
build up pretty much unop-
posed. 
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Corporate peace divi-
dends have also aggravated 
domestic disparities. Over 
the past decade, Israel has 
become one of the less 
egalitarian countries in the 
industrial world. Its high-
tech boom only smiled on a 
minority, causing the in-
come ratio between the top 
and bottom 20% of the 
population to rise to 21.3, 
compared to 10.6 in the 
U.S. 2  With unemployment 
surpassing 10% and rising, 
it was clear that peace had 
failed to bring prosperity for 
most Israelis. 
Perhaps the most im-
portant detail, however, is the demographic basis of Zion-
ism, which the Israeli elite allowed, almost haphazardly, to 
erode beyond reversal. Out of a total population of 6 mil-
lion, 15% are now Muslims, 4% Christian and Druze Ar-
abs, 15% are immigrants who arrived during the 1990s 
from the former Soviet Union (some with only remote 
                                                 
2 Note that during the early 1950s, ‘socialist’ Israel was still one 
of the most egalitarian countries in the world, with the top 20% 
of the population earning only 3.3 times the income of the 
bottom 20%. This achievement was certainly impressive, 
particularly relative to the ‘free market’ countries such as the 
United States, where the comparable ratio was a high as 9.5. 
But Israel learnt fast, and after two generations of 
‘Americanisation’ already outperformed its tutor.  
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connection to Judaism and most with little Zionist sociali-
sation), and 4-6% are foreign workers imported in recent 
years to replace the Palestinians. Roughly 40% of the popula-
tion therefore have either limited or no affinity to the Zionist pro-
ject. The remaining 60% are also split by two deep cleav-
ages – an ethnic one between Ashkenazi (European) and 
Sepharadi (Middle-Eastern) Jews, and a religious one be-
tween orthodox and secular Jews. The orthodox popula-
tion is commonly poorer, and although supportive of a 
hawkish stance against the Arabs, many of its members do 
not serve in the army. The secular segment is often more 
conciliatory, although its increasingly individualistic out-
look limits its willingness to kill and be killed for anachro-
nistic nationalist goals. The increasing individualism of this 
majority, however, undermines its group cohesion, thus 
making it more difficult to act in unison against the xeno-
phobic minority. 
And so just as Israel’s business elite become transna-
tional, it also lost the domestic stability on which to base 
itself. At the same time the elite lacked any clear ideas on 
what to do about it. Globalised business ties required 
peace, yet globalisation itself was contributing to the condi-
tions that undermined the prospects for such peace. 
TOWARD ANOTHER WAR? 
When the second Palestinian Intifada broke out in October 
2000, prime-minister Barak, representing an elite torn be-
tween its Zionist allegiances and transnational aspiration, 
seemed unsure as to what to do. Alarmed by the Palestini-
ans loss of fear, anxious that his army may be unable to 
win a guerrilla war (let alone a fully-fledged one), and 
aware that conflict will shatter the hard-won business con-
fidence, he hesitated, tending to respond rather than initi-
ate. At the same time, his apprehension about disintegrat-
ing ‘Jewish’ cohesion made it impossible for him to accept 
a democratic, non-ethnic solution to the conflict. His suc-
cessor in the job, though, had no such hesitations. Once in 
power, Ariel Sharon immediately escalated both the rheto-
ric and military pressure, eventually all but re-conquering 
the West Bank.  
Many have attributed this shift to personality and ide-
ology. Sharon never wanted peace, they pointed out. On 
the contrary, his plan was always to kick out the Palestini-
ans in order to establish a ‘Greater Israel’ west of the River 
Jordan, and now was his last chance to do it.  
Perhaps. But, again, there is a far bigger picture that 
needs to be considered here. 
When Sharon came to power, the neoliberal high-tech 
order was already on its last leg. The first signs of trouble 
appeared several years earlier in the global periphery, with 
excess production triggering a series of crises which spread 
from Asia in 1997, to Russia, South Africa, Brazil, Argen-
tina and the rest of the developing world. Then, the price of 
oil shot up, soaring from $10 in 1999 to $30 in 2000, and 
throwing a monkey wrench into the longest post-war eco-
nomic expansion. The Nasdaq and other high-tech mar-
kets, having already reached valuation extremes, were 
punctured, going into a nose-dive, and in early 2001, a 
hawkish administration with deep ties to oil and armament 
interests literally took over the White House. In short, eve-
rything seemed ready for a reversal of fortunes. Fittingly, 
as the new century took off, high-tech profits dropped like 
a stone, while the earnings of oil and armament companies 
soared (Figure 1). 
Seen from this broader perspective, the escalating con-
flict in the Middle East – much like ‘September 11’ and the 
attack on Afghanistan – may well be part of yet another 
global shift in accumulation.  
Central to this process is the renewed struggle between 
the two massive business formations. The Weapondollar-
Petrodollar Coalition, having been in decline for more than 
a decade, is now once more trying to stir up conflict and 
stagflation; and so far, the political backwind is clearly on 
its side. But the jury on this contest is still out. The Tech-
nodollar-Mergerdollar Alliance, whose fortune rest with 
open-border neoliberalism, high-tech growth and cross-
border mergers, stands to loose big time from such devel-
opments. And having recovered from the initial shock of 
September 11, its representatives, both in Europe and the 
U.S., are beginning to voice their objection to further esca-
lation, including Washington’s support for Sharon and its 
plan to attack Iraq. 
As Kalecki put it more than thirty years ago, ‘It is a 
sad world indeed where the fate of all mankind depends 
upon the fight between two competing groups within 
American big business. This, however, is not quite new: 
many far-reaching upheavals in human history started 
from a cleavage at the top of the ruling class.’ 
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